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ABSTRACT 
Warnings can help prevent damage and harm if they are issued timely and provide information that help 
responders and population to adequately prepare for the disaster to come. Today, there are many indicator and 
sensor systems that are designed to reduce disaster risks, or issue early warnings. In this paper we analyze the 
different systems in the light of the initial decisions that need to be made in the response to sudden onset 
disasters. We outline challenges of current practices and methods, and provide an agenda for future research.  
To illustrate our approach, we present a case study of Typhoon Haiyan. Although meteorological services had 
issued warnings; relief goods were prepositioned; and responders predeployed, the delivery of aid was delayed 
in some of the worst hit regions. We argue for an integrated consideration of preparedness and response to 
provide adequate thresholds for early warning systems that focus on decision-makers needs.    
Keywords 
Early warning systems, decision support, vulnerability assessment, indicator framework, Typhoon Haiyan, 
disaster response 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Timely information has been described as key to disaster response (IFRC 2014, Kamissoko et al. 2014,b). 
Understanding and adequately reacting to early warning signs, before these become manifest and turn into acute 
needs is in many cases more effective and efficient than responding only after a disaster hit (Swithern, 2014). 
Ideally, early warning signals should trigger appropriate actions to prevent harm from the population, such as 
evacuation, or to get ready to respond, such as pre-positioning of goods and deployment of responders  
Today, the world is suffering from violence and conflict; resource scarcity; epidemics; and natural hazards such 
as floods, storms, or earthquakes. Depending on the nature of the disaster, signals, and how to interpret them as 
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well as the time for safe intervention (window of opportunity) will vary. In this paper, we focus exclusively on 
sudden onset disasters and present a case study analysing the initial response to Typhoon Haiyan that hit the 
Philippines in 2013. In this case study, we combine findings from field research and almost 40 interviews with 
responders (Van de Walle & Comes 2014; 2015) with theoretical findings on indicator systems used for 
preparedness and (early) warnings. Besides drawing from academic literature on vulnerability, Early Warning 
Systems (EWS), and decision analysis, we refer to publications of UN agencies on Haiyan, the Philippines 
government, and meteorological services that allow us to trace how the warnings triggered the response.  
The preparation for and response to disasters requires well aligned information flows; decision processes; and 
coordination structures (Quarantelli, 1988, Kamissoko et al., 2014b). Yet, the information management and 
decision-making processes dedicated to preparedness are most often separate from the response (Tomasini & 
Van Wassenhove, 2009).  
“We accept chaos to start operations”, one interviewee from the ICRC told us in Guiuan in December 2013 
(Van de Walle & Comes, 2015). In this paper, we analyze how the response to Typhoon Haiyan was initiated, 
and why the damages were so massive, despite the alerts. We start from a comparison of the systems used in the 
preparedness and response phase. In a previous conceptual paper (Comes, Mayag, & Negre, 2014), we have 
suggested to investigate the dependence of the different indicators used for EWS and vulnerability assessments. 
We will show that, indeed the indicators do not overlap, indicating a disconnect between preparedness and 
response. Moreover, there is no relation to the decisions that need to be taken – and the implications with respect 
to time available or information required. From there on, we describe how indicator systems and warnings 
should to be designed to reduce the chaos that seems so characteristic for the early response. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Warnings, and the decisions to evacuate the population; deploy disaster relief teams into a region; or pre-
position goods, are the interface between preparedness and response. Figure 1 shows that the earlier a warning 
is, the more time there is to plan and coordinate preventive activities. However, the information about the 
hazard becomes more accurate as time passes. A typhoon typically starts as a precipitation over sea. As it 
evolves and approaches land, its path and magnitude can be better predicted, enabling more precise forecasts of 
damages and needs. Additionally, the threat becomes more concrete and the willingness to act and comply with 
preventive measures rise, which disrupt day-to-day life and business. Decision-makers need to carefully balance 
the timing of early warning decisions by taking into account 
 Intervention points: what are possible actions? How much time is required to perform each action? 
How much time until disaster will strike? 
 Accuracy and precision of information about the disaster: its magnitude, path, and consequences 
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Figure 1.  The Context of Early Warning Decisions 
 
EWS are combine the functions of monitoring, decision-making and communication. To this end, they combine 
communication hardware that must be reliable and robust, especially during the natural disasters; with a 
communication platform. Ideally, the latter enables interactions among decision-makers, affected population, 
experts predicting the magnitude and consequences of the disaster, and responders, turning. Communication 
technology into a key element in early warning (EWC II 2003, Grasso, 2012). Since in sudden onset disasters 
time is short, messages are often simplified and reduced to a simple “Red Alert”, instead of providing concrete 
advice and guidance on the next steps or establishing a platform for deliberation.  
Vulnerability Assessments 
The impact of a disaster is worst, where it hits vulnerable population and regions, or critical infrastructures and 
economic sectors. Vulnerability describes the susceptibility of a society or system to damages from a hazard 
event (Bonapace, Srivastava, & Mohanty, 2012; Cardona, 2004; UN/ISDR, 2008). In supply chain management 
processes are critical, if they are vital for a supply chain’s success (Craighead et al. 2007; Klibi, Martel, & 
Guitouni, 2010). Here, we define infrastructures or services as critical if their functioning is essential for the 
society, for instance in terms of protection of the population; environmental targets; or longer term economic 
development. 
Vulnerability and criticality assessments can help focus early warning decisions. Depending on the nature of 
aims, different facets can be emphasized: vulnerability can focus on specific socio-demographic aspects, such as 
age, or health (Adger, 2006; Weichselgartner & Kasperson, 2010); economic development (Cannon & Müller-
Mahn, 2010; Ingram, Franco, Rio, & Khazai, 2006; Merz, Hiete, Comes, & Schultmann, 2012); or (critical) 
infrastructures (Egan, 2007; Wang, Hong, & Chen, 2012). Other branches address the vulnerability of 
geographical regions against specific hazards, often focusing on protection of coastal regions against floods or 
storms (Adger, 1999; Grünthal et al., 2006; Judge, Overton, & Fisher, 2003; Torresan et al., 2008).  
Although vulnerabilities are typically measured on cardinal scales, the values are used to establish ordinal 
vulnerability rankings that enables decision-makers to prioritize regions, sectors or communities that require 
most attention and protection. Yet, to our best knowledge there are currently no systems that explicitly take into 
account planned interventions and actions in the acute phase of a disaster or emergency when setting up the 
vulnerability assessments and scales.  
Early-Warning Systems (EWS) 
Early-warning is the provision of timely and effective information that allows organizations and individuals to 
take action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective response (Hyogo, 2005). Although EWS are 
specific to the context, some general principles have been defined by Glantz (2004): continuity in operations, 
timely warnings, transparency, integration, human capacity, flexibility, and neutrality – partially matching the 
humanitarian principles humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. According to the UN (2006) and 
the Public Entity Risk Institute (2010), a complete and effective EWS comprises four elements: risk knowledge; 
monitoring and warning service; dissemination and communication; and response capability. Failure of any part 
of the system will imply failure of the whole system. Since we are interested in the design of EWS, we focus on 
risk knowledge, which takes into account prior knowledge of the risks and planning of the control system in 
terms of sensors, measures, scales, and thresholds.  
To issue precise and adequate warnings, EWS need to combine current and local information with knowledge 
from past events, static structures, and trends (Schrodt and Gerber, 1998; MEA, 2003). In order to provide 
relevant and actionable information EWS need to be user-centred, interoperable and facilitate interactions 
between decision-makers, and stakeholders (Hall, 2007; Hyogo, 2005).  In an era that is characterised by 
international collaborations (Engel et al., 2010) respecting the different requirements and information sharing 
protocols of the involved organizations and actors has become more challenging than ever before (Swithern, 
2014). Hence, there is a need for transparent and structured processes that support the design of EWS and take 
into account  
- Societal and organizational preferences, requirements, and protocols; 
- Vulnerabilities and criticalities of potentially affected regions; 
Characteristics of potential mitigation measures and intervention windows.  
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MEASURING THE FUTURE - TYPHOON INDICATOR SYSTEMS  
Indicators help decision-makers turn abstract concepts such as vulnerability into concrete guidance on where to 
focus attention and resources. Yet, there is no consensus on which indicators should be used for which purpose, 
and how the values of indicators as diverse as Atmospheric Moisture and Corruption Level should be combined 
to provide support disaster responders. 
 
Indicators and Thresholds 
An indicator is a decision support tool that helps decision-makers breaking complex problems down into small 
and measurable portions, focusing on the most important aspects of a situation. Indicators can be qualitative or 
quantitative; some indicators are themselves aggregate indices. The usefulness of an indicator depends primarily 
on its ability to reflect the intended aspect of reality, but also its ease of acquisition and understanding. An 
effective indicator must satisfy several criteria: 
 Robust, reliable, accurate and specific: interpretation is stable and consistent over time 
 Sensitive: reflects changes in what is measured or synthesized 
 Understandable, simple and usable by all stakeholders 
 Relevant relative to the objective 
 Acceptable cost compared to the service rendered 
 Useful: adding information to the decision-making 
To be operational, an indicator is delivered with a simple rule to interpret its meaning. One of the most well 
known indicators is certainly climate change, where there are fierce debates about to which threshold global 
warming needs to be limited, to avoid uncontrollable damage. For a guideline on how to derive such threshold 
for meteorological phenomena, see (Guzetti et al. 2007). Knowledge and experience about the meaning and 
significance of the indicator, and its values or its interplay with other indicators need to be available to 
determine a threshold, corresponding to the limit between satisfactory and unsatisfactory or acceptable and 
unacceptable conditions.  
 
Vulnerability Indicator Systems 
Owing to the abstract nature and ambiguity of the concept, indicators in many cases have defining character, and 
determine our understanding of what vulnerability is, rather than providing a scale to measure it. Typically, 
hierarchical composite indicator frameworks are used, which combine qualitative and quantitative aspects 
(Birkmann, 2007; Cutter, 2003), for instance breaking down the vulnerability of a region against a hazard into 
the dimensions  
1. Geography and environmental conditions; 
2. Socio-Economic capacity, infrastructure systems;  
3. Response capacity.  
Procedures for indicator selection balance theoretical views on vulnerability with pragmatic considerations of 
data collection and availability of information (Birkmann, 2007). In Table 1, we provide an overview indicators 
relevant for Typhoon Haiyan. The table is based on a survey of papers focusing on vulnerability of coastal 
regions or islands against storms and floods. From an initial set of more than 47 papers that we found via a 
google scholar search, we than extracted those that provided an indicator system: (Adger, 2006; Balica, Douben, 
& Wright, 2009; Birkmann, 2006; Brooks, Neil Adger, & Mick Kelly, 2005; Fekete, 2009; Turvey, 2007). Per 
indicator we provide also the functional relation to vulnerability (increasing (+) or decreasing (-)) and its 
category: exposure (Exp), fragility (Frag) or resilience (Res). 
Interestingly, most authors focus on the socio-economic capacity: indicators characterizing the vulnerability of 
the population, and its proximity to the area at risk are among the most frequent indicators. For the geographical 
and environmental conditions, the coastline is the only indicator used by several authors. This may be related to 
the fact that the indicators in this category relate to the exposure, which is not always understood as component 
of vulnerability. The indicators for response capacity are unique for each paper, indicating the fragmented 
understanding of how the ability to manage and respond to a disaster can be predicted. Interestingly, 
international interventions and the ability to coordinate with the UN system or international volunteer 
communities, for instance, are completely missing, highlighting that preparedness is still understood as a local 
or national endeavour. 
 COMES et al. 
 
Early Warning and Decision Support Systems 
 
Long Paper – Decision Support Systems 
Proceedings of the ISCRAM 2015 Conference - Kristiansand, May 24-27 
Palen, Büscher, Comes & Hughes, eds. 
 
  
Table 1: Selection of Typhoon Relevant Vulnerability Indicators  
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Geography and Environmental Conditions 
Sea-level rise Exp mm/year + x 
     
Storm surge Exp Cm + x 
     
# of cyclones Exp # + x 
     
River discharge Exp m
3
/s + x 
     
Foreshore slope Exp % - x 
     
Soil subsidence Exp m
2
 + x 
     
Coastline Exp Km + x x x 
   
Socio-Economic Capacity 
Cultural heritage Exp # + x 
     
Population Density  Frag % + 
    
x 
 
Population close to coastline  Exp # People + x x x x 
  
Growing coastal population Exp % + x x 
    
Urban growth Exp % + 
 
x 
    
Arable land Frag % + 
  
x 
   
Percentage Female Frag % + 
   
x 
 
x 
Percentage people under 10/12/18 Frag % + 
   
x 
 
x 
Percentage of people over 60/65 Frag % + 
   
x 
 
x 
% of disabled persons  Frag % + x 
     
Nutrition Frag kcal/p - 
 
x 
    
Response Capacity 
Shelters Res #   - x 
     
Awareness  Res 
# events/ 
10 years - x 
    
x 
Presence EWS Res Binary + 
     
x 
Implementation of buffer zones Res Binary + 
     
x 
Estimated recovery time  Res days + x 
     
Drainage Res km - x 
     
Number of physicians Res #/1000 p - 
 
x 
    
Number of hospital beds Res # - 
 
x 
    
Control of corruption Res Index - 
    
x 
 
Government effectiveness Res Index - 
    
x 
 
R&D investment Res % GNP - 
    
x 
 
Social networks Res % + 
     
x 
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Access to information Res #Radios + 
     
x 
Table 1 also shows that typically, indicators provide a static snapshot of the situation. Mostly, indicators are 
based on statistical data on a national or broader regional scale, or indices (such as Government effectiveness). 
Trends and patterns, such as steep decline of the health care system, or deterioration of living conditions cannot 
be detected with such systems.  
Due to the variety of indicators, measured on different scales, a normalization process turning the data into 
comparable information is required. Most commonly, an indicator si is be normalised using a fragility function 
fi
d
 indicating to which extent value v(si) of indicator i will increase or reduce the vulnerability in one of the 
above dimensions d. Typically,   
  [  
    
 ]       , where 1 represents total vulnerability, whereas 0 indicates 
that there is no contribution to the vulnerability within this dimension. Resilience and exposure functions are 
designed similarly (Merz et al., 2012). To model how indicators for different dimensions contribute to the 
overall vulnerability, they are aggregated first intra-, then inter-dimensional. The most common approach is 
using a linear aggregation function. Nanduri et al. (2002) provide an overview of alternative models. 
 
Early-Warning Indicator Systems 
In general, the indicators of typhoon EWS are only used during the monitoring phase before the disaster. 
Warnings in this context are based on meteorological forecasting models. Often, meteorologists refer to these as 
the “spaghetti models” because when laid out on a map, the storm paths resemble strings of spaghetti. To 
monitor a typhoon, the EWS usually take into account some key indicators, identified by Gray (1975), such as 
sea surface temperatures above 26°C; moist tropical atmosphere; broad-scale convection; low-level inflow with 
upper outflow and weak vertical wind shear.  
After a desk review and literature research (NOAH Project, 2014; Ng, 2014; Neussner, 2009; Briones, 2014; 
Neussner, 2014), we selected in Table 2 a list of indicators that were used in the response to Typhoon Haiyan. 
This list reflects our understanding, resulting from academic literature, project reports, evaluations, satellite 
imagery (PAGASA cyclone map, meteo Doppler
1
 for precipitations), and news reports. Other signals, such as 
changing tides, anxious animals, rumours, and word of mouth, rely on sensual and first hand impressions, that 
were not accessible to us. We are aware that the list is not complete in this respect. Some satellite pictures were 
useful ut also some indicators such as the ones presented in the next table. 
Table 2: Typhoon Early Warning Indicators 
Indicator Description Unit 
Wind speed Indicator of storm’s intensity measuring speed of wind. Part of 
the Beaufort scale. 
km/h 
Beaufort scale Empirical measure relating wind speed to observed conditions 
at sea or on land.  
discrete scale 
between 1 and 12.  
Sea Surface 
Temperature 
Global trends °C 
Low-level air inflow  Influx of warmth/moisture from air into storm systems.   
Upper-level outflow Air that flows outwards from a storm system,  
Cloud-top 
Temperatures 
Temperature and height of opaque, semi-transparent and sub-
pixel cloud tops. 
°C 
Atmospheric moisture 
(humidity) 
Water vapor in air Kg  
Rainfall ratio Ratio of total amount of rain to the duration mm/h  
Rainfall Contour Isohyetal lines show areas of equal precipitation mm/h  
3/6/12/24 hours 
rainfall 
Accumulated rainfall over 3/6/12/24 hours  mm 
                                                          
1 A weather radar is a type of radar used in meteorology to locate precipitation, calculate their movement and determine their 
type (rain, snow, hail, etc.). The three-dimensional structure of the data obtained allows inferring the movements of clouds 
and precipitation in and identifying those that may cause damage. Finally, using rainfall as tracers, we can deduce the radial 
direction and speed of winds in the lower atmosphere. 
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Water pressure  Mbar 
Pressure Contour Area of equal or constant pressure; an isopleth or contour line 
of pressure.  
Mbar 
Real feel Index for perceived outside temperature  °C 
Water level Height of surface of water  m  
Storm surge Rising water in coastal areas; severity determined by 
topography of coast and timing of tides – cf. geographical 
vulnerability indicators in Table 1 
m  
 
Comparing Tables 1 and 2, there is no overlap between the indicators, although the problems are interrelated: 
EWSs should provide timely estimates of potential risks to protect the most vulnerable people and to prepare for 
replacing the most vulnerable infrastructures (cf. Figure 1). Moreover, the vulnerability indicators hide the time 
dimension; important trends or relations between the indicators are neglected, whereas most EWS indicators 
capture a development in a given amount of time.  
 
Some steps towards integrating real-time forecasting into EWS have ben made. For instance, the Hurricane 
component of FEMA’s HAZUS Model  provides prediction models based on wind-induced loads, building 
response, damage, and then loss, rather than simply using historical loss data to model loss as a function of wind 
speed, (Chung et al., 2011). Such a model, however, require complete and reliable data sets on building 
infrastructure, economy, and population. More importantly even, there is no clear indication which actions the 
population, or a humanitarian organization should take, and there is no structure component to reconcile the 
conflicting preferences and orchestrate the response.  
THE RESPONSE TO TYPHOON HAIYAN 
The Philippines are confronted with some of the highest disaster risks worldwide: with respect to earthquakes, 
storms, and flooding it is ranked among the 10 countries with highest mortality (Mosquera-Machado & Dilley, 
2008). Therefore, levels of preparedness are relatively high (Brower, Magno, & Dilling, 2014). The Philippines 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010
2
 shapes the preparedness and response operations in the 
Philippines, assigning the role of coordination to the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management 
Council (NDRRMC).  
Early Warnings 
Table 3 summarizes relevant EWS indicators, the categories and respective thresholds used for Typhoon Haiyan 
(CEDIM, 2013; Weather Unisys, 2013; NOAA, 2013; AGORA, 2013a,b,c).  
 
Table 3: Early Warning Indicators and Thresholds for Haiyan 
                                                          
2 See http://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/878EN.pdf 
Warnings Indicators Levels Thresholds 
Storm surge warnings Storm surge 
1 . < 2m 
2 2m < . < 5m 
3 . > 5m 
Flood warnings 
24-hours 
rainfall 
1 < 129mm 
2 129mm < . < 240mm 
3 . > 240mm 
Public Storm Warning Wind speed 1 30-60 km/h within 36 hours 
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Haiyan was first noticed as a weather disturbance with the potential of developing into a tropical storm on 3 
November 2013 (Neussner, 2014), Indeed, by exceeding all relevant thresholds, EWS in South Eastern Asia, 
predicted that Haiyan would severely harm the provinces of Leyte and Eastern Samar. Early warnings were 
issued two days before Haiyan’s landfall by PAGASA (Philippines Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical 
Services Administration) and JTWC (Joint Typhoon Warning Centre). On November 7th, 2013, the Japan 
Meteorological Agency top windspeeds of 315 km/h (Neussner, 2014). Few hours later, Haiyan made its first 
landfall in the Philippines at Guiuan, Eastern Samar, without losing intensity. Haiyan reached level 3 of storm 
surge (5.2 m in Tacloban Airport (PAGASA, 2014)), level 3 for flood warning, level 5 for wind speed (230 
km/h  and 315 km/h, (PAGASA, 2014)), the level "Red" for heavy rain warning and all 4 levels of Public Storm 
Warning Signal were triggered by region (NASA, 2014)).  
Despite these warnings, initial reports estimated 4.3 million people to be affected by Typhoon Haiyan. Later, the 
number rose later over 14 million people, of which more than 4 million lost their homes and livelihoods
3
.  
From Early Warning to Response – A role for Vulnerability Assessment and Decision Analysis 
Although the impact could not be precisely predicted, massive damage was expected. In the transition phase 
from warning to response, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) engaged with local 
municipalities to evacuate families in particularly exposed areas, identified adequate evacuation centers or 
reinforced the roofs of buildings
4
. The military was activated, volunteers were deployed; transportation systems 
and trucks pre-positioned and food packages and medical aid kits were packed (NDRRMC Sit Rep No. 4). The 
ASEAN states sent an AHA team to Manila to prepare for the response, and several NGOs that were already 
active in the country such as ICRC prepared to respond onsite. The Digital Humanitarian Network (DHN) was 
activated by UN-OCHA on November 7, 2013. Members of the DHN network and the larger Virtual and 
Technology community mobilized. MapAction, Humanitarian Open Street Map, GIS Corps, ESRI Disaster 
response Program, Translators and Statistics without Borders, Info4Disaster and many others activated their 
networks, working remotely or sending volunteers into the disaster struck area. 
Dispatching and deploying decisions need to be made quickly, using forecasts and preliminary assessments as 
well as professional experience and context-based knowledge. Decisions in this phase are therefore are 
necessarily based on uncertain and incomplete information that cannot be verified until after the disaster. 
National authorities appeared to be highly aware of needs and had accurate baseline information. Many 
interviewees during the field visit of the DRL team (Chan & Comes, 2014; Van de Walle & Comes, 2014), 
described these strengths, which were considered as “of extraordinary quality as compared to other disasters”. 
However, Common Operational Datasets (CODs) needed to be improved and completed during the response. 
Because of the high pressure, this happened often in parallel in government agencies and by NGOs (Ebener, 
                                                          
3 UN OCHA situation report number 34, as of January 28 2014 http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-typhoon-haiyan-situation-
report-no-34-28-january-2014 
4http://www.gov.ph/2013/11/06/dswd-preps-for-possible-impact-of-storm/ 
Signals (PAGASA, 
2014) 
expected within 
period of time 
2 60-100 km/h within 24 hours 
3 100-185 km/h within 18 hours 
4 Greater than 185 km/h within 12 hours 
Saffir-Simpson 
hurricane wind scale 
Top wind speed 
1 33-42m/s, 119-153 km/h 
2 43-49 m/s, 154-177 km/h 
3 50-58 m/s, 178-208 km/h 
4 58-70 m/s, 209-251 km/h 
5 >70 m/s, > 252 km/h 
Heavy Rain warning 
(PAGASA, 2014; 
Palafox, 2014) 
Observed 
rainfall and 
rainfall amount 
from Doppler 
radars 
1 - Yellow 
7.5-15 mm within 1 hour ; most likely to 
continue for next 3 hours. 
2 - Orange 
15 - 30 mm within 1 hour ; most likely to 
continue; or continuous rainfall for past 3 hours 
is more than 45 mm to 65 mm. 
3 - Red 
More than 30mm within 1 hour or continuous 
rainfall for past 3 hours with more than 65mm. 
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Castro, & Dimailig, 2014).  
The fact that most pre-deployed staff and goods were routed to the hubs of Manila and Cebu instead of to the 
most vulnerable areas such as the rural areas of Leyte and Eastern Samar, implied that goods arrived particularly 
late in the hardest hit regions. Additionally, efforts to reinforce buildings came too late to have a considerable 
impact, highlighting the importance of taking into account the temporal aspects and intervention windows. 
Therefore, we propose a decision analytical approach that takes into account EWS and vulnerability information 
to initiate the response.   
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
Typhoon Haiyan highlighted the lack of effectiveness of current EWS: it had been clearly understood that the 
damages would be massive some days before the Typhoon made landfall
5
. However, the problems with 
communications of the storm surge and the lack of shelters prevented many people from seeking, or if they 
sought, in finding safe shelters –resulting in the death of hundreds (Heydarian, 2013). The vulnerability of 
population and critical infrastructures such as healthcare, communication, or food and water supply has not been 
integrated into, making it difficult to predict where help will be needed most urgently. To this date, the early 
response decisions are largely based on experience instead of structured decision support (Van de Walle & 
Comes, 2014)..  
EWS are designed to initiate the response. Yet, simple warnings about the nature of an event are not sufficient. 
Rather, the warning should reflect the context and possible mitigation measures that the decision-makers can 
choose, such as reinforcing shelters and setting up emergency telecommunication systems; pre-positioning fleet 
of trucks, food and water supplies; evacuation; and activation of the local or international response. Since these 
strategies determine when a warning should be issued, and which information it needs to convey, EWS can no 
longer be understood as a binary problems, where the decision consists in issuing an alert (or not).   
 
 
 
Figure 3: Isolated Vulnerability Assessments (left) and EWS (right) 
Figure 3 shows the situation as it is today. On the basis of continuous vulnerability functions, categories are 
formed that are used to prioritise disaster risk reduction efforts and allocate resources, focusing mostly on 
longer-term development aims. Contrarily, EWS thresholds are often defined in terms of a simple binary scale, 
reflecting tipping points above which an intervention (of unclear nature) is necessary. There is currently no 
systematic or explicit integration between both. 
To ensure that warnings respect the preparation times (from an alert to completed preventive action), we 
propose to elaborate a decision model that uses vulnerability and EWS indicators as well as potential 
interventions to determine appropriate thresholds that take into account the local context. The concept is shown 
in Figure 4, which outlines that the different vulnerability levels should be aligned with the EWS thresholds. 
Warnings are not issued any more on basis of a simple step function; rather we envision various levels with 
intrinsic continuous escalations (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Our Vision: Interplay of Vulnerability (left) and EWS (right) 
For both systems, we would like to emphasize the importance to define warnings as an interpretation of the 
values given by an aggregation function combining both indicators of EWS and vulnerability. While Figures 3 
and 4 only show individual indicators, the overall vulnerability or warning decision should take into account the 
interplay of indicators. For instance, one can elaborate an overall score of vulnerability; derive thresholds; and 
then combine these with respective overall scores of EWS indicators. The simple aggregation function usually 
used is the weighted sum where weights associated to indicators can be determined according to the preferences 
of government authorities and experts in EWS and vulnerabilities. In this way, preferential information about 
the most critical aspects for the society can be combined with the information about expected impact and 
damage of a hazard.  
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